On February 2, 2026, the Central Bank of Nigeria released what may be the most important fintech policy document in African financial history: a 35-page comprehensive assessment of Nigeria’s fintech ecosystem that reads less like a regulatory decree and more like an honest conversation.
Governor Olayemi Cardoso’s foreword sets the tone: “This was not a policy declaration but a listening session.”
That statement alone marks a seismic shift in how Africa’s largest economy approaches financial innovation. But the real question isn’t whether the CBN listened well—it’s whether Nigeria can execute on what it heard.
This analysis examines the report’s findings, assesses its potential economic impact, and identifies the critical execution gaps that will determine whether this document becomes a transformational roadmap or another well-intentioned report gathering digital dust.
What the Report Gets Right: The Diagnostic
1. Honest Acknowledgment of Nigeria’s Leadership (And Its Limits)
The report correctly positions Nigeria as a fintech pioneer, particularly in real-time payments:
The Achievement:
- Nigeria implemented nationwide real-time interoperable payments in 2011
- This was years ahead of the US (2017), India’s UPI scale-up (2016), and most advanced economies
- Over 11 billion transactions processed in 2024, up from 5 billion in 2022
- 25% of all electronic transactions now flow through real-time channels
The Reality Check: The report doesn’t just celebrate—it acknowledges that “innovation is not the same as transaction.” Nigeria has the infrastructure. What it lacks is execution discipline, regulatory clarity, and the trust frameworks necessary to convert technical capability into economic transformation.
This honesty is rare in government documents. Most regulators would emphasize success and bury challenges. The CBN did the opposite, creating a document that fintech operators can actually use.
2. Split Perception of Regulation: A Wake-Up Call
Perhaps the report’s most valuable insight:
50% of fintech operators view regulation as supportive.
50% view it as restrictive.
This isn’t a victory. It’s a crisis of credibility.
When half your ecosystem sees you as an enabler and the other half sees you as an obstacle, you don’t have a unified regulatory framework—you have inconsistent application, unclear guidance, and procedural chaos.
The report doesn’t hide from this. It confronts it directly:
- 62.5% of operators cite “delays in approvals” and “ambiguity in existing guidelines” as top challenges
- 37.5% report that it takes over a year to bring new products to market
- 87.5% say compliance costs “significantly impact innovation capacity”
Translation: Nigeria has the policies. It lacks the processes to implement them efficiently.
3. Infrastructure Gaps Honestly Assessed
The report doesn’t pretend Nigeria’s digital infrastructure is complete. It catalogs specific gaps:
Identity Systems:
- BVN exists and works (transformative achievement)
- NIN exists but integration is patchy
- The problem isn’t absence—it’s fragmentation, cost, and reliability
- 37.5% of fintechs cite “lack of digital identity or credit history” as the top barrier to reaching excluded populations
Interoperability:
- 50% of stakeholders rate system-wide interoperability as “poor”
- Global Standing Instruction (GSI) rollout incomplete
- Open Banking guidelines exist (2023) but implementation lags
- APIs are fragmented, data-sharing protocols inconsistent
The Insight: Nigeria doesn’t need new policies for infrastructure. It needs to finish implementing the ones it already has.
4. The Fraud Problem: Domestic and International
The report tackles Nigeria’s fraud reputation head-on—and does so with nuance:
The Facts:
- 87.5% of fintechs use AI primarily for fraud detection (most common use case by far)
- Digital financial crimes attributed to Nigeria often involve foreign or cross-border actors
- Law enforcement cooperation shows “a significant share” of crimes are “orchestrated by foreign or cross-border actors, often using Nigeria as a base or proxy”
The Progress:
- Nigeria exited the FATF “grey list” (significant milestone)
- AML/CFT Regulations (2022) and Cybersecurity Framework (2018) now in force
- Enhanced KYC requirements closing compliance gaps
The Remaining Challenge: Reputation lags reality. Nigeria has made credible, measurable progress on financial integrity—but international perception hasn’t caught up. The report acknowledges this explicitly, noting that “reputation is one of the most valuable assets of any financial system.”
Critical Insight: The CBN understands that technical compliance isn’t enough. Perception management and transparent communication of reform outcomes are equally critical for attracting investment and enabling cross-border expansion.
What the Report Proposes: The Policy Agenda
The CBN outlines ten priority policy options and multiple institutional frameworks. Here’s the assessment:
Strong Proposals (High Impact, Feasible)
1. Standing Fintech Engagement Forum
What it is: A permanent, institutionalized platform for two-way dialogue between regulators and fintech operators (similar to Bankers’ Committee model)
Why it matters:
- 75% of fintech operators want regular engagement forums
- 100% expressed willingness to collaborate through pilots, sandboxes, working groups
- Current ad-hoc engagement creates uncertainty and delays
Economic Impact: High. Structured dialogue reduces regulatory friction, speeds product approvals, and builds trust. This alone could reduce time-to-market from 12+ months to 3-6 months for many products.
Execution Risk: Low. The CBN already has institutional experience with Bankers’ Committee. This is replication, not innovation.
Verdict: ✅ Do this immediately. This is the foundation for everything else.
2. Regulatory Sandbox 2.0
What it is: Expansion of existing sandbox to include AI, RegTech, cross-border payments, embedded finance—with broader participation (MFBs, PSBs, telcos)
Why it matters:
- 62.5% of fintechs “very interested” in AI-focused sandbox
- Current sandbox exists (2021) but is narrow in scope
- Global precedent (Singapore, UK) shows sandboxes work when well-designed
Economic Impact: Medium-High. Enables rapid innovation testing without full regulatory burden. Particularly important for AI/ML deployment in credit scoring, fraud detection, and financial inclusion.
Execution Risk: Medium. Sandboxes require dedicated resources, clear graduation criteria, and regulatory capacity to supervise experiments.
Verdict: ✅ Expand aggressively. This is where Nigeria can leapfrog peers.
3. Digital Banking License (vs. PSB Reform)
What it is: Create dedicated digital banking framework enabling new entrants to offer credit and savings services
Why it matters:
- Current PSB (Payment Service Bank) restrictions prevent lending
- 62.5% of fintechs operate or plan cross-border expansion—need proper banking infrastructure
- Stakeholders overwhelmingly cited PSB lending restrictions as major barrier to inclusion
Economic Impact: Very High. This unlocks fintech lending at scale, expanding MSME access to credit and driving financial inclusion beyond transactions into productive finance.
Execution Risk: High. Requires careful prudential framework, capital requirements, supervision model. Can’t just copy PSB license—needs distinct risk-based approach.
Verdict: ✅ Critical for next phase of growth, but must be designed carefully to avoid creating under-capitalized, risky lenders.
4. Expand GSI to Fintechs and MFIs
What it is: Global Standing Instruction allows automatic debt recovery across banks. Currently limited to banks; proposal extends to fintech lenders and microfinance institutions.
Why it matters:
- 50% of stakeholders rate interoperability as “poor”
- Fragmented credit infrastructure limits fintech lending
- Borrowers can currently evade repayment by switching banks
Economic Impact: Medium-High. Reduces credit risk for fintech lenders, lowers interest rates for borrowers, expands credit access to underserved segments.
Execution Risk: Medium. Technical integration challenging but feasible. Main barrier is coordinating across banks, fintechs, MFIs.
Verdict: ✅ Essential for credit market maturation. Prioritize execution.
Ambitious Proposals (High Impact, Difficult Execution)
5. Single Regulatory Window
What it is: Centralized portal for multi-agency onboarding, licensing, reporting—one interface for all regulatory compliance
Why it matters:
- 62.5% of fintechs support this
- Currently, fintechs deal with CBN, SEC, CAC, NITDA, NCC—fragmented, duplicative
- Delays and ambiguity stem partly from having to navigate multiple agencies
Economic Impact: Very High if executed well. Could reduce compliance costs by 30-50%, accelerate product launches, eliminate regulatory overlap.
Execution Risk: Very High. Requires:
- Cross-agency coordination (notoriously difficult)
- Unified digital infrastructure
- Agreed workflows and SLAs
- Political will to cede individual agency control
Similar efforts (Start-up Act) have struggled.
Verdict: ⚠️ Conceptually excellent, execution historically elusive. Start with pilot involving just 2-3 agencies, prove concept, then expand. Don’t try to build everything at once—that’s where past efforts failed.
6. Regulatory Passporting (Cross-Border Licensing)
What it is: Mutual recognition of licenses across African jurisdictions—get licensed in Nigeria, operate in Ghana/Kenya/Senegal/South Africa without re-licensing
Why it matters:
- 62.5% of Nigerian fintechs plan regional expansion
- Current model: Apply for separate licenses in each country
- Fragmented regulatory landscape limits African scale
Economic Impact: Very High for ecosystem. Creates continental market, enables Nigerian fintechs to compete regionally, attracts investment to “passport-enabled” jurisdictions.
Execution Risk: Extremely High. Requires:
- Bilateral or multilateral agreements with peer central banks
- Harmonized supervisory standards
- Cross-border enforcement mechanisms
- Political willingness to recognize foreign licenses
Precedent: EU passporting took decades. ECOWAS/EAC versions still nascent.
Verdict: ⚠️ Strategically critical but multi-year effort. Start with bilateral pilots (Nigeria-Ghana, Nigeria-Kenya) to prove concept before attempting wholesale framework.
7. Fintech Credit Guarantee Window
What it is: Blended-finance mechanism to de-risk MSME lending by fintechs, administered with DFIs, targeting youth/women-led enterprises
Why it matters:
- 37.5% of fintechs call capital access “difficult” or “very difficult”
- MSMEs underserved by traditional banks
- Fintechs have distribution but lack risk mitigation for thin-file borrowers
Economic Impact: High if properly structured. Could unlock billions in MSME credit, create jobs, support informal economy formalization.
Execution Risk: High. Requires:
- Clear eligibility criteria
- DFI partnership (DBN, AfDB, IFC)
- Sustainable funding model
- Performance tracking
Precedent: Similar schemes globally show mixed results—success depends on design and governance.
Verdict: ⚠️ Valuable tool but complex execution. Design with clear metrics and sunset clauses to avoid perpetual subsidy.
Questionable Proposals (Unclear Impact or Feasibility)
8. Compliance-as-a-Service (CaaS)
What it is: Shared utility for fintech compliance—centralized reporting, KYC, fraud intelligence
Why it matters:
- 87.5% of fintechs say compliance costs impact innovation capacity
- Smaller fintechs can’t afford robust compliance infrastructure
- Duplication across companies is inefficient
Economic Impact: Unclear. Could reduce costs significantly OR create single point of failure, data security risks, and regulatory dependency.
Execution Risk: High. Who operates it? CBN? NIBSS? Private consortium? How is data governed? What if the utility fails?
Verdict: ⚠️ Conceptually interesting but needs much more detail. Pilot narrowly (e.g., shared fraud database only) before expanding to full compliance utility.
9. Fintech Trust and Safety Charter
What it is: Voluntary code of conduct for data protection, responsible AI, fair competition, grievance redress
Why it matters:
- Could differentiate responsible operators
- May build consumer trust
- Provides reputational signal
Economic Impact: Low to Medium. Voluntary standards rarely have teeth. Industry self-regulation often becomes lowest-common-denominator rather than raising bar.
Execution Risk: Low (because voluntary, so limited enforcement challenge).
Verdict: ⚠️ Nice-to-have but not game-changing. Worth doing but don’t expect major impact unless linked to licensing fast-tracks or other tangible benefits.
10. Responsible AI Workstream
What it is: Multi-stakeholder group (regulators, industry, academia, international peers) to advance ethical AI principles, supervisory methodologies, talent development
Why it matters:
- 87.5% of fintechs already use AI (primarily fraud detection)
- 62.5% very interested in AI sandbox
- Global AI governance rapidly evolving
Economic Impact: Medium-Long Term. Positions Nigeria to shape African AI standards, attract AI-focused investment, build supervisory capacity.
Execution Risk: Medium. Workstreams can become talk shops unless structured with clear deliverables and timelines.
Verdict: ✅ Do it, but with concrete outputs: AI regulatory guidance, supervisory playbooks, talent programs. Avoid creating another committee that just meets.
What the Report Doesn’t Address: The Critical Gaps
For all its strengths, the CBN report has notable blind spots:
1. The Enforcement Question
The Gap: The report catalogs what should happen but doesn’t explain how the CBN will enforce compliance or hold agencies accountable for implementation.
Why It Matters:
- Nigeria has excellent policies. It consistently fails at execution.
- PSV2025 exists—many initiatives aren’t delivered.
- Open Banking Guidelines (2023)—implementation incomplete.
- Regulatory Sandbox (2021)—uptake and graduation unclear.
What’s Missing:
- Implementation timelines with specific milestones
- Accountability mechanisms (who gets fired if this doesn’t happen?)
- KPIs and public dashboards tracking progress
- Consequences for regulatory agencies that don’t deliver
Economic Impact of This Gap: Potentially catastrophic. Without enforcement and accountability, this report risks becoming aspirational rather than operational.
2. The Cost Question
The Gap: Most proposals have significant financial implications, but the report doesn’t discuss budget, funding sources, or resource allocation.
Examples:
- Single Regulatory Window: Requires major IT investment, staff, maintenance
- Regulatory Sandbox expansion: Needs dedicated supervisors, technical capacity
- Credit Guarantee Window: Needs capital pool (hundreds of millions)
- CaaS utility: Substantial infrastructure and ongoing operating costs
What’s Missing:
- Cost estimates for each initiative
- Funding sources (budget, levies, donor support, public-private partnerships)
- Prioritization based on ROI
- Realistic sequencing based on resource constraints
Why It Matters: Unfunded mandates don’t get implemented. The CBN needs to tell stakeholders not just what will happen but how much it costs and who’s paying.
3. The Talent Question
The Gap: Multiple proposals require significant regulatory capacity—AI supervision, cross-border coordination, SupTech deployment, real-time oversight. The report acknowledges “capacity building” but provides little detail.
The Reality:
- Fintech moves faster than regulatory hiring cycles
- Best talent goes to private sector (higher pay, more interesting work)
- Supervisory skills in AI, cybersecurity, data analytics are scarce globally
What’s Missing:
- Detailed capacity development plan
- Partnerships with universities, international regulators
- Competitive compensation for specialized roles
- Secondment programs bringing fintech operators into regulatory roles temporarily
Economic Impact: You can’t supervise what you don’t understand. Without massive investment in regulatory talent, sophisticated proposals like AI oversight and cross-border supervision will fail.
4. The Telecom-Finance Convergence Gap
The Gap: PSBs are majority-owned by telecom companies (MTN, Airtel, Glo, 9mobile). The report mentions coordination with NCC (telecom regulator) but doesn’t address the fundamental tension:
The Issue:
- Telecoms want to leverage massive distribution (200M+ subscribers)
- They’re supervised primarily by NCC, not CBN
- Financial services require different risk management than telecom services
- Data usage, airtime-as-credit, mobile money—all blur lines between sectors
What’s Missing:
- Clear framework for joint CBN-NCC supervision
- Rules on data sharing between telecom and financial subsidiaries
- Governance standards for telecom-owned financial entities
- Strategy for when telecom business model conflicts with financial prudence
Why It Matters: As airtime increasingly functions as “quasi-money” and telcos expand into payments/credit, regulatory ambiguity creates systemic risk. The report acknowledges this briefly but doesn’t provide solutions.
5. The Political Economy Question
The Gap: The report treats regulatory reform as technocratic when it’s deeply political.
The Reality:
- Incumbent banks benefit from barriers to fintech competition
- Some regulatory agencies resist coordination (turf protection)
- States may resist federal coordination (taxation, licensing)
- Powerful interests oppose certain reforms (e.g., data openness threatens proprietary advantages)
What’s Missing:
- Strategy for managing political resistance
- Coalition-building approach (who are allies for each reform?)
- Communication plan to build public pressure for implementation
- Mechanisms to overcome bureaucratic inertia
Example: Single Regulatory Window sounds great until you realize it requires SEC, CAC, NITDA, NCC, CBN to all agree to centralize processes. Each has budget, staff, mandate tied to current system. Who drives that difficult negotiation?
The Economic Impact Scenarios
Based on the report’s proposals and Nigeria’s execution track record, here are three scenarios:
Scenario 1: Full Execution (10% Probability)
Assumptions:
- All ten priority policies implemented within 18 months
- Strong accountability mechanisms
- Adequate funding and talent
- Cross-agency coordination succeeds
Economic Impact (2026-2030):
- Fintech sector grows 15-20% annually (vs. current 8-12%)
- Financial inclusion rises from 64% to 80%+ (adding 35M+ adults)
- Nigeria reclaims #1 position in African fintech funding
- MSME credit access expands significantly (500K+ new borrowers)
- Cross-border fintech revenue grows 3-5x
- Regulatory certainty attracts $2-3B additional VC investment over 5 years
GDP Impact: +0.5-0.8 percentage points annually
Job Creation: 150,000-200,000 direct/indirect jobs
Why Unlikely: Nigeria’s track record doesn’t support this optimism. Too many initiatives, insufficient enforcement history, political economy barriers.
Scenario 2: Partial Execution (60% Probability)
Assumptions:
- 4-5 of ten priorities implemented
- Focus on “easy wins”: Fintech Forum, Sandbox expansion, Digital Banking License
- Some initiatives stall: Single Window, Passporting, CaaS
- Implementation takes 24-36 months instead of 18
Economic Impact (2026-2030):
- Fintech sector grows 10-12% annually (modest acceleration)
- Financial inclusion rises to 72-75% (adding 18-22M adults)
- Nigeria maintains top-3 position in African fintech funding
- MSME credit access expands moderately (200-300K new borrowers)
- Limited cross-border success
- Regulatory improvements attract $800M-1.2B additional VC investment
GDP Impact: +0.2-0.4 percentage points annually
Job Creation: 60,000-100,000 direct/indirect jobs
Why Likely: This matches Nigeria’s historical pattern—significant but incomplete progress. Enough to claim success, not enough to transform.
Scenario 3: Minimal Execution (30% Probability)
Assumptions:
- 1-2 initiatives implemented (likely Fintech Forum only)
- Most proposals remain aspirational
- Execution stalls due to funding, coordination, political resistance
- Report becomes reference document rather than action plan
Economic Impact (2026-2030):
- Fintech sector grows 6-8% annually (slower than recent trend)
- Financial inclusion stagnates at 66-68%
- Nigeria falls to 4th-5th in African funding (behind Kenya, Egypt, South Africa)
- MSME credit access barely improves
- Continued regulatory uncertainty
- Investor confidence declines; funding drops
GDP Impact: Negligible to slightly negative (opportunity cost)
Job Creation: Minimal (20,000-30,000)
Why Possible: If this report isn’t accompanied by political commitment, budget allocation, and accountability mechanisms, it joins the long list of well-intentioned Nigerian policy documents that fade into irrelevance.
What Would Maximize Success Probability?
To shift from Scenario 3 toward Scenario 2 (or ideally Scenario 1), Nigeria needs:
1. Presidential-Level Commitment
What: President Tinubu publicly endorses report, directs full ministerial support, appoints implementation czar
Why: Cross-agency coordination requires top-down authority. No CBN Governor, no matter how capable, can force SEC, NITDA, NCC to cooperate without presidential backing.
2. Public Implementation Dashboard
What: Online portal tracking each initiative with:
- Clear milestones and deadlines
- Responsible agency/official
- Status updates (monthly)
- Explanation for delays
Why: Transparency creates accountability. If citizens can see what’s not happening, political pressure builds for action.
3. Funded Implementation Unit
What: Dedicated team (20-30 people) housed at CBN with:
- Budget for all initiatives
- Authority to convene agencies
- Technical experts (not just bureaucrats)
- Regular reporting to Governor/President
Why: Without a dedicated team, this falls to officials with existing full-time jobs. Implementation becomes “spare time” work, which means it doesn’t happen.
4. Phased Rollout with Quick Wins
What: Implement in three phases:
- Phase 1 (0-6 months): Fintech Forum, Sandbox expansion, GSI to fintechs
- Phase 2 (6-18 months): Digital Banking License, Open Banking completion, Regional passporting pilots
- Phase 3 (18-36 months): Single Window, Credit Guarantee, CaaS
Why: Quick wins build momentum and credibility. Trying to do everything simultaneously guarantees nothing gets done well.
5. Link to National Economic Objectives
What: Explicitly tie fintech development to:
- Tinubu administration’s $1 trillion GDP target
- Youth employment goals
- MSME development strategy
- Digital economy policy
Why: When fintech is seen as contributing to core national priorities, it gets political support and budget allocation. If it’s just “CBN’s thing,” it’s lower priority.
The Bottom Line: A Great Diagnostic, Uncertain Prognosis
The CBN’s “Shaping the Future of Fintech” report is exceptional by the standards of regulatory publications. It’s honest, data-driven, stakeholder-informed, and pragmatic.
What It Proves:
- The CBN listened carefully to the ecosystem
- Governor Cardoso understands what needs to change
- Nigeria has the technical capacity to design good policy
What It Doesn’t Prove:
- That Nigeria can execute on what it designed
- That cross-agency coordination will happen
- That political economy barriers will be overcome
- That budget and talent will materialize
The report’s quality makes its potential failure more tragic. This isn’t a case of bad policy that deserves to fail. It’s excellent policy that might fail anyway due to execution gaps Nigeria hasn’t solved in decades.
For Nigerian Fintechs: How to Respond
Don’t Wait for Full Implementation
Assume Scenario 2 (partial execution). Identify which 3-5 initiatives are most likely to happen (Fintech Forum, Sandbox, GSI expansion, Digital Banking License) and position your company to benefit from those specifically.
Engage Aggressively
The Fintech Forum is almost certain to happen—it’s low-cost, high-visibility, and the CBN has proven it can convene stakeholders. Be part of that forum. Shape the agenda. Volunteer for pilot programs.
Build for Cross-Border Now
Even if passporting doesn’t materialize, the direction is clear: Nigerian fintechs will operate regionally. Structure your company, get necessary licenses, build relationships in target markets. Don’t wait for perfect regulatory alignment.
Invest in Compliance Infrastructure
Whether or not CaaS happens, regulatory expectations are rising. The CBN is clearly moving toward more sophisticated supervision. Build compliance systems that can scale with regulatory scrutiny.
Document Everything
If you face regulatory delays, ambiguity, or inconsistent treatment—document it. Share anonymized examples with the Fintech Forum when it exists. The CBN can’t fix what it doesn’t see.
For Investors: The Risk-Reward Calculation
Bullish Case (Scenario 2): If Nigeria executes even partially, the market opportunity is massive:
- 220M population, 220M mobile subscribers, 64% financially excluded
- Existing fintech infrastructure is world-class
- Regulatory direction is positive
- Government clearly understands what needs to change
Realistic investment thesis: Back teams capable of navigating partial reform, building resilience against regulatory uncertainty, and capturing opportunities as they materialize.
Bearish Case (Scenario 3): If execution stalls, Nigeria becomes higher-risk than peers:
- Kenya has better regulatory clarity and follow-through
- Egypt moving aggressively on fintech despite economic challenges
- South Africa has stable, predictable frameworks
Realistic risk mitigation: Diversify across African markets. Don’t bet everything on Nigerian execution.
For the CBN: The Credibility Test
This report will define Governor Cardoso’s tenure.
If three years from now:
- The Fintech Forum is meeting quarterly
- Digital Banking Licenses have been issued
- GSI includes fintechs
- Open Banking is fully operational
- At least one bilateral passporting pilot is live
Then: Cardoso will be remembered as the governor who transformed Nigerian fintech from chaotic to structured, from aspirational to operational.
If three years from now, most initiatives remain “under review” or “in progress,” this report becomes evidence of good intentions without follow-through—which is arguably worse than not having published it at all.
Conclusion: The Listening Was Excellent. Now Comes the Hard Part.
The CBN’s 2025 Fintech Report is a masterclass in stakeholder engagement, honest diagnosis, and pragmatic policy design.
It represents the best of what Nigerian institutions can produce when they prioritize evidence over ideology, dialogue over decree, and learning over defensiveness.
But Nigeria’s challenge has never been policy design. It is execution.
The report acknowledges this implicitly: “The impetus for this report was a dedicated Fintech Policy Forum convened by the CBN.” Translation: We talked a lot. Now we have to do things.
Whether this report becomes transformational or merely aspirational depends entirely on what happens in the next 6-18 months:
- Does the Fintech Forum actually launch, or does it fade like similar initiatives?
- Do agencies receive budgets to implement proposals, or are they expected to do more with existing resources?
- Does the President signal that this matters, or does it remain a CBN-only priority?
- Are there consequences for agencies that don’t deliver, or is delay consequence-free?
The optimistic take: This report shows Nigeria can diagnose its challenges accurately and design intelligent solutions. That’s huge progress from denial or finger-pointing.
The realistic take: Diagnosis and design are 20% of the journey. Implementation is 80%. Nigeria’s track record on the 80% is poor.
The harsh take: Without enforcement mechanisms, accountability structures, adequate funding, and political commitment, this report is an expensive literature review—well-researched, thoughtfully written, and ultimately decorative.
The Nigerian fintech ecosystem deserves better than decorative policy.
It deserves execution.
Governor Cardoso and the CBN team did their part. They listened, synthesized, and proposed.
Now it’s on the rest of the government—and the fintech ecosystem itself—to prove that Nigeria can actually build what it designed.
The listening was excellent.
The execution will determine everything.
Full Report Available: CBN Fintech Report 2025
This analysis is based on publicly available information and represents independent research. Views expressed are those of the author and do not represent any official position.
