When Nairagram Raised ₦10 Billion in 48 Hours Three Weeks Ago, It Exposed a Truth Most Nigerian Fintechs Don’t Want to Hear

Opinion: Earlier this month, a payments company fully subscribed a commercial paper offering in two days. Three weeks later, the lesson still hasn’t landed — institutional investors will back African fintech, but only if you’ve built real infrastructure, not just hype.
When Nairagram Raised ₦10 Billion in 48 Hours.

Nairagram, a pan-African payments and financial infrastructure company most people outside the industry have never heard of, did something remarkable earlier this month. The company raised ₦10 billion (approximately $6 million) through a commercial paper issuance. That’s not the remarkable part — several Nigerian companies issue commercial paper annually. What was remarkable is that the entire offering was fully subscribed within 48 hours of going to market.

Forty-eight hours. Not forty-eight weeks. Not after a months-long roadshow across Lagos, London, and New York. The Central Bank of Nigeria granted final regulatory approval on January 26. Nairagram launched the issuance on February 3. By February 4, institutional investors had committed the entire ₦10 billion. By February 5, the transaction was finalized.

Three weeks have passed since then. And the lesson Nairagram’s raise taught us still hasn’t landed in most corners of Nigeria’s fintech ecosystem.

That speed told you something important then, and it tells you something even more important now: when institutional capital trusts your numbers, understands your business model, and believes your cash flows are predictable, they move fast. The question — still unanswered three weeks later — is why Nairagram, a company processing $2 billion annually across 37 African countries but rarely mentioned in the same breath as Flutterwave, Moniepoint, or Interswitch, managed to inspire that kind of confidence when so many better-funded, higher-profile fintechs still can’t.

The answer isn’t flattering to most of Africa’s fintech darlings. And watching how the ecosystem has responded in the weeks since — with more hype, more fundraising announcements that never materialize, more consumer apps chasing the same saturated market — suggests the lesson still hasn’t been learned.

What Nairagram Actually Does (And Why Nobody Talks About It)

Nairagram isn’t a consumer app. It doesn’t have a million-user waitlist or viral TikTok campaigns. It’s B2B infrastructure — the pipes that move money between banks, mobile money operators, and remittance services across Africa. Think of it as the SWIFT network for African cross-border payments, except it actually works at African speeds and African price points.

The company operates a unified API platform that enables deposits, mobile money transfers, and cash pickups across Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry, Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda, and dozens of other markets. When a Nigerian in Lagos sends money to a family member in Accra, there’s a decent chance that transaction is riding on Nairagram’s rails. When a remittance company needs to pay out cash to recipients in rural Kenya, Nairagram’s network of agents makes that possible.

It’s not sexy. It’s not consumer-facing. And it’s not the kind of business that generates TechCrunch headlines about “disrupting remittances” or “banking the unbanked.” It’s infrastructure. And infrastructure, when built correctly, generates predictable cash flows that institutional investors love.

Idris Ibrahim, Nairagram’s President and Co-Founder, framed the ₦10 billion raise in exactly those terms: “The speed and scale of the subscription reflect institutional confidence not only in our business, but in the broader opportunity to build resilient, African-owned financial infrastructure that supports trade, remittances, and economic growth across the continent.”

That’s a mouthful. But notice what he didn’t say. He didn’t say Nairagram is “revolutionizing” or “disrupting” anything. He said it’s building infrastructure. Boring, essential, cash-flow-generating infrastructure. And institutional investors bought ₦10 billion of commercial paper in 48 hours because infrastructure, unlike hype, can be underwritten.

Why Most Fintechs Can’t Do This

Commercial paper is short-term debt — typically 30 to 270 days — that companies issue to finance working capital. It’s cheaper than bank loans because it cuts out the intermediary. But it only works if institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, treasury managers) believe you can pay them back on time. That requires:

  1. Predictable revenue — cash flows that investors can model with confidence
  2. Low default risk — a track record of paying obligations on time
  3. Regulatory compliance — CBN approval, audited financials, transparent governance
  4. Real operations — not just a pitch deck, but actual infrastructure generating actual revenue

Most African fintechs fail on at least two of those criteria.

Take the consumer lending apps that flooded Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana between 2019 and 2023. Dozens of them raised equity from VCs, marketed aggressively on social media, and burned through capital acquiring users. Very few could issue commercial paper because their default rates were high, their revenue was lumpy, and their regulatory compliance was questionable. When the Central Bank of Kenya started cracking down on predatory lending in 2023, half of them shut down.

Or take the B2B e-commerce platforms like Alerzo, which this month defaulted on a ₦4.38 billion loan and is now liquidating assets to avoid insolvency. Alerzo raised $20 million in equity. It operated for six years. It served thousands of retailers. But it couldn’t have issued commercial paper because its unit economics never worked. The company was burning cash, not generating it.

Nairagram, by contrast, processes $2 billion annually in payments and operates profitably across 37 markets. That’s not speculation. That’s audited revenue flowing through regulated financial rails. And that’s why institutional investors were comfortable lending ₦10 billion on 30-180 day terms earlier this month — while Alerzo, around the same time, found itself unable to service even a single commercial loan.

The ₦50 Billion Plan: Ambition or Overreach?

Building on the momentum from the ₦10 billion raise, Nairagram announced plans to raise up to ₦50 billion in 2026 through a combination of capital market instruments — likely additional commercial paper, bonds, or convertible notes. That’s a fivefold scale-up in less than 12 months.

Is that realistic? Maybe. The company is operating in 37 countries and processing $2 billion annually. If it can demonstrate consistent quarter-over-quarter growth in transaction volume, maintain regulatory compliance across multiple jurisdictions, and keep default rates low, then yes — institutional investors will continue backing expansion.

But ₦50 billion is also a bet that Nairagram’s infrastructure thesis is correct: that the future of African fintech is not consumer apps fighting for the same urban millennials, but B2B infrastructure serving the banks, mobile money operators, and remittance companies that move most of Africa’s money. If that thesis holds, Nairagram becomes the Stripe or Plaid of Africa — invisible to consumers, indispensable to businesses, and enormously profitable.

If the thesis doesn’t hold — if fragmentation persists, if regulatory barriers remain insurmountable, if competition from VISA, Mastercard, and Cellulant intensifies — then Nairagram will struggle to deploy that capital efficiently, and the ₦50 billion target will look like overreach.

For now, the ₦10 billion raise says institutional investors believe the thesis. But belief is cheap. Execution is hard.

What This Means for African Fintech (And Why It Still Hasn’t Sunk In)

Nairagram’s 48-hour commercial paper raise earlier this month was a signal that African fintech is maturing. Not because consumer-facing apps are scaling (they’re not, mostly). But because B2B infrastructure is generating the kind of predictable cash flows that allow companies to access capital markets rather than relying solely on equity from venture capitalists.

That was important then. It’s even more important now, three weeks later, as we’ve watched:

  • Alerzo collapse under debt it couldn’t service
  • Multiple consumer lending apps continue struggling as regulatory scrutiny intensifies
  • VC funding remain scarce, with most African fintechs unable to raise follow-on rounds
  • Hype-driven announcements continue dominating headlines while actual businesses like Nairagram operate quietly and profitably

The pattern is clear. The market is starting to separate signal from noise. Institutional debt investors bet on cash flows. VCs bet on growth. And in February 2026, cash flows matter more than growth metrics that don’t translate into profitability.

Third, it creates a model for other infrastructure plays. If Nairagram can raise ₦10 billion in 48 hours, then other B2B fintechs — payment processors, liquidity providers, core banking platforms, credit bureaus — can follow the same playbook. Build real infrastructure. Generate predictable revenue. Maintain regulatory compliance. Access capital markets. That’s a more sustainable path than chasing unicorn valuations through equity funding rounds that never materialize.

The Uncomfortable Question Still Nobody’s Asking

Here’s the question Nairagram’s raise three weeks ago forced us to confront, and which remains unanswered today: if institutional investors can fully subscribe a ₦10 billion commercial paper offering in 48 hours for a B2B infrastructure company most people have never heard of, why can’t better-known, better-funded fintechs do the same?

The answer, uncomfortable as it was earlier this month and remains today, is that most African fintechs can’t issue commercial paper because their businesses don’t generate the predictable cash flows required to service debt. They’re still burning venture capital to acquire customers, subsidize transactions, and chase growth metrics that don’t translate into profitability.

Three weeks ago, Nairagram proved something fundamental. It’s not exciting. It doesn’t have a million-user waitlist. It’s not “disrupting” anything. But it processes $2 billion annually, operates across 37 countries, and raised ₦10 billion in 48 hours because institutional investors looked at the numbers and said: yes, we believe you can pay us back.

That was the difference between a fintech company and a fintech business then. It remains the difference today. And it’s a distinction that matters more with each passing week, as the gap widens between companies that generate cash and companies that burn it.

The lesson was there earlier this month. It’s still here now. The question is whether anyone’s actually listening.


Nairagram is a pan-African payments and financial infrastructure company headquartered in Nigeria. The company processes over $2 billion in payments annually across 37 African countries. In early February 2026, it raised ₦10 billion through commercial paper in 48 hours and announced plans to raise up to ₦50 billion total in 2026.


Disclaimer: This is an opinion/editorial piece. The views expressed are those of the author and do not constitute financial or investment advice.


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