Why SIM Swap Fraud Is Pushing African Telcos Into Authentication

African operators sit on the best evidence of SIM swap fraud, yet most banks still treat an SMS OTP as proof of identity. As Nigeria’s TIRMS and GSMA Open Gateway APIs put network signals within reach.
SIM Swap Security Alert
SIM Swap Security Alert

A six-digit code lands on your phone, and your bank treats it as proof that you are you. That bet gets worse every year. Many African banks and fintechs still lean on the SMS OTP to guard logins, transfers and wallet resets. Yet the phone number behind it no longer reliably points to one person.

The party that knows when it stops doing so is not the bank. It is the operator. That is why the authentication debate is moving from the handset to the network, and why African telcos are being pulled into it.

Nigeria’s regulators have effectively said so. On April 20, 2026, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) signed a memorandum of understanding that launched the Telecoms Identity Risk Management System, or TIRMS. NCC Executive Vice Chairman Aminu Maida said the portal gives financial institutions real-time insight into the status of a mobile number, including recycled and flagged lines. CBN Governor Olayemi Cardoso signed for the central bank. When regulators build a registry because numbers cannot be trusted, the number has stopped being an identity.

Why a Phone Number Is Not an Identity

A text-message code proves one thing: someone controls whatever receives it. It says nothing about who that someone is. The phone network is not a vault. SIMs get swapped, numbers get ported, and idle lines return to the pool.

NIST’s current authentication guidelines now put that doubt on paper. They name exactly one restricted method: sending a secret over the phone network, by SMS or voice. An organisation that accepts it must acknowledge that the risks “will likely increase over time.” It must also offer an unrestricted alternative, warn users, and keep a migration plan ready.

NIST writes for American agencies, not Nigerian banks. Still, a standards body restricts a channel when the threat has moved. The same text adds that codes typed in by hand are not phishing-resistant. An impostor site can simply relay them.

How SIM Swap Fraud and Recycled Numbers Break the Code

Nigeria’s own paperwork shows the exposure. Under the NCC’s August 2026 business rules for subscriber registration, lines that sit idle for about a year are delinked and churned. Operators must purge the National Identification Number from recycled SIMs so a new subscriber can link their own. The rules also require a recycle call to the NCC’s central database, the National Identity Management Commission and the Nigeria Inter-Bank Settlement System (NIBSS) for financial institutions.

That call concedes a point. A number in a bank’s records can change hands. The check only helps institutions that run it.

Swaps add a second hole. The same rulebook bars any agent blacklisted for fraudulent SIM registration or replacement from all networks. A working paper from the National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies, drawing on NIBSS data, lists SIM swaps among the dominant threats to electronic payments in Nigeria. Phishing, social engineering and insider collusion sit beside them.

Nigeria has spent years tying every line to an identity. The NCC’s SIM-NIN linkage enforcement has been weeding out unverified connections, and the goal is sound. But a cleaner register is not a secure channel. The registration rules themselves trigger an OTP to the subscriber’s line when someone upgrades a SIM. The habit runs deep.

Nigeria is the best-documented case, not the only exposed market. Mobile numbers anchor banking and wallets from Lagos to Nairobi, and the same flaw travels. The sector at risk is mapped in TechMoonshot Insights’ State of Fintech in Africa 2025 report.

What Operators Know That Banks Do Not

An SMS code is only as trustworthy as the line it travels to. The operator is the one party that can say whether that line changed hands an hour ago. Network APIs turn that knowledge into something a bank can query.

Two are central. A SIM Swap API reports whether the SIM tied to a number changed recently, either as a timestamp or as a yes-or-no answer for a chosen window. A Number Verification API confirms that the device making a request is the one holding that number’s SIM, with no code sent at all. Both are defined under the GSMA’s Open Gateway programme and built on the open CAMARA specifications.

African operators are already in the programme. When MTN, Telkom and Cell C announced the two APIs for South Africa in 2024, they framed them as a response to fraud and digital identity theft in banking, finance, insurance and retail. Reporting by Ecofin says MTN Group and Airtel Africa have deployed GSMA-backed SIM swap verification in some of their markets. Aggregators are following. NetAPI Telecom, based in Kenya, joined as a channel partner with five certified APIs, SIM Swap among them. In Nigeria, MTN’s Chenosis unit sells checks on whether a number is still active and whether a swap occurred.

The logic is simple. A fraudster can spoof an app screen, a caller ID or a bank’s own SMS. Network-layer signals are far harder to fake from outside, because they come from the system that issues the SIM. That is the shift. The operator stops being a pipe for the code and becomes a source of evidence about the code’s destination.

The Best Case for SMS, and What the Fraud Data Shows

The headline numbers look reassuring. The working paper reports, citing NIBSS figures presented at the 2026 Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum, that electronic payment fraud losses fell 51% in 2025. They dropped to ₦25.85 billion from ₦52.26 billion a year earlier. Reported cases declined to about 67,515.

Defenders of SMS will seize on that drop, and their case deserves a hearing. A code reaches any handset on any network, with no app, no data plan and no smartphone. For a customer on a basic phone, an authenticator app is not an upgrade. It is a locked door. The paper also credits coordinated work by regulators and institutions, plus progress such as BVN and NIN integration, so layered defences clearly count.

Notice what that case supports. SMS can remain the channel. It does not follow that SMS should remain the proof.

Why the APIs Are Not Yet Doing the Work

The tools exist. Adoption is the weak point. At the TIRMS discussions, MTN’s regulatory manager reportedly said a SIM swap notification system linking the NCC, the CBN and NIBSS is already in place, yet hardly any banks use it. Techeconomy’s coverage warned that without a CBN mandate, TIRMS could end up as a capable system nobody calls.

Money and blame sit underneath. MTN Nigeria’s Tobe Okigbo has argued that using phone numbers as identifiers was a choice between banks and their customers, not operators, and that banks relying on them should pay for the security layer. Banks hear a toll on a problem they did not create. Operators hear a demand to secure a decision they did not make. Both positions have some logic, and neither protects the customer.

Three other obstacles remain. Reporting on TIRMS notes that pulling in data from Globacom and 9mobile will need standard APIs, commercial agreements and compliance with the Data Protection Act 2023. Consent and purpose limits matter, because a swap signal is personal data. And regulators in some markets are cautious about identity-related APIs, SIM swap included, which slows rollout. A fraudster needs only the weakest network in the chain.

Who Pays When the Right Code Comes From the Wrong Person

The data offers three warnings. First, the numbers do not isolate the problem. TechMoonshot could not find a public breakdown of losses tied to diverted or phished codes. Totals fall, but the cause stays hidden.

Second, the same paper warns that declining institutional reporting raises the risk of underreported incidents. A good year may flatter the picture. Third, a 51% drop still leaves ₦25.85 billion lost in a single year.

Then comes liability. The paper urges lawmakers to define how losses are shared among banks, payment service providers and customers. It also wants clear timelines for complaint resolution and reimbursement. Until that happens, a correct code reads as consent. If a swapped SIM or a relay attack delivered that code to the wrong person, the customer must prove a negative.

Network APIs change that argument. Once a swap signal is available for a fee, a bank that sends a code to a freshly swapped line without checking has made a choice. The customer did not choose the channel. The institution did. NIST’s logic puts the risk acceptance on the organisation, in writing. African regulators should demand the same paper trail, and since Nigeria’s fintech rulebook has changed faster than most compliance plans, an authentication policy belongs in the next revision.

A Practical Exit: Network Signals Plus Phishing-Resistant Authentication

Start by tiering risk. A text-message code can stay for low-value actions. It should not approve a new payee, a higher limit, a new device or an account recovery, least of all soon after a SIM change.

Next, query the network before sending the code. NIST tells verifiers to weigh risk indicators such as SIM change and number porting. A SIM Swap API, or TIRMS in Nigeria, supplies exactly that. A bank that skips the check should explain why.

Do not stop there, because network signals have a limit. They detect a hijacked line. They do not detect a customer tricked into reading a code to a fake site, since that code reaches the genuine owner. For that threat, move toward device-bound sign-in. NIST cites WebAuthn, the standard behind passkeys, as an example of phishing resistance. Keep a fallback for customers on basic phones. Treat it as the exception, with tighter limits.

Operators have homework too. They should price swap and number-status checks so that small fintechs can afford them, and publish how those checks work. They should align Glo, 9mobile and the others behind common standards. The NCC rules require real-time notifications of SIM registrations to the devices of NIN-linked subscribers, and enforcement of the agent ban should be visible and audited. The CBN, for its part, should require banks to query network signals before sensitive actions. It should require any institution that keeps SMS for those actions to document its accepted risk and a migration date. It should also publish OTP-linked loss data, so the next debate runs on numbers.

The SMS OTP earned its place in a world where one SIM meant one person. That world is gone. SIMs move, numbers recycle, and codes can be phished or relayed. Operators hold the best evidence of when that has happened, and banks hold the duty to ask. The question for African banks, fintechs and telcos is not whether to move on. It is whether they move before customers pay for the delay.

The views expressed are the author’s own.

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