On January 16, 2026, Nigeria’s Securities and Exchange Commission enacted what may be remembered as the single most destructive regulatory intervention in African tech history. Under the guise of “investor protection” and “market resilience,” the SEC’s new circular raises minimum capital requirements by up to 3,900%—effectively pricing out local innovators while rolling out the red carpet for foreign capital and legacy financial institutions.
The timing could not be worse. Nigeria has just slipped to fourth place in African startup funding rankings after years of continental leadership, yet the SEC’s response is to make it even harder for Nigerian founders to compete.
This is not reform. This is regulatory capture disguised as prudence.
This research article takes an unequivocal stance: Nigeria’s SEC has catastrophically misread the moment, importing regulatory frameworks designed for mature markets while ignoring the developmental realities of emerging ecosystems. Through comparative analysis with similar economies—Kenya, India, Indonesia, and Brazil—we demonstrate that Nigeria is charting a uniquely destructive path that will:
- Consolidate financial services in the hands of incumbent players
- Drive innovation offshore to more accommodating jurisdictions
- Create a multi-tier system favoring foreign over domestic capital
- Reverse a decade of fintech-led financial inclusion gains
- Position Nigeria as a cautionary tale rather than a competitive destination
The Numbers: A Barrier Dressed as “Protection”
What Changed
The ISA 2025 doesn’t just raise the bar—it rebuilds the entire building at a height most Nigerian founders cannot reach:
Fund Management (Portfolio/Asset Management)
- Old requirement: ₦20 million (~$14,000)
- New requirement: ₦5 billion (~$3.5 million)
- Increase: 24,900% (not a typo)
Broker-Dealer Operations
- Old requirement: ₦300 million (~$211,000)
- New requirement: ₦2 billion (~$1.4 million)
- Increase: 566%
Issuing Houses
- Old requirement: ₦300 million (~$211,000)
- New requirement: ₦2 billion (~$1.4 million)
- Increase: 566%
Securities Trading (Dealing)
- Old requirement: ₦100 million (~$70,000)
- New requirement: ₦500 million (~$352,000)
- Increase: 400%
The Implied Message
At ₦5 billion for fund managers and ₦2 billion for broker-dealers, the SEC is essentially saying: “If you don’t have access to generational wealth, institutional backing, or foreign capital, your innovation is unwelcome here.”
For context, $3.5 million is:
- More than the Series A rounds of most Nigerian startups
- Approximately what established fintechs raise after proving product-market fit
- 35x Nigeria’s GDP per capita
- More than what 99% of Nigerian founders can personally access
The Extreme Stance: This Is Regulatory Imperialism
Thesis: Nigeria Has Imported the Wrong Playbook at the Wrong Time
Nigeria’s SEC has made a fundamental category error: they have adopted the regulatory posture of a mature, saturated financial market while operating in an emerging economy crying out for innovation, competition, and inclusion.
This is not about investor protection. This is about market capture.
The evidence:
1. Timing Could Not Be Worse
Nigeria is experiencing:
- 40%+ youth unemployment
- Naira devaluation is creating currency instability
- Record-low FDI inflows
- Brain drain of technical talent to the UK, Canada, US
- Banking sector consolidation is leaving millions underserved
In this context, raising barriers to financial innovation is economic malpractice.
2. The “Protection” Narrative Doesn’t Hold
Investor protection comes from:
- Robust disclosure requirements
- Transparent governance standards
- Effective supervision and enforcement
- Swift punishment of bad actors
- Clear redress mechanisms
Not from simply making it prohibitively expensive to operate.
Kenya has proven this: with lower capital requirements but stronger supervision, their fintech sector thrives while maintaining investor confidence.
3. This Benefits Exactly One Group: Incumbents
Who wins when new entrants are priced out?
- Existing banks and asset managers (who already meet these thresholds)
- Foreign financial institutions (for whom $3.5M is a rounding error)
- Legacy players are facing competition from nimble fintech challengers
Who loses?
- Local founders without generational wealth
- Tech-enabled financial inclusion platforms
- Young Nigerians seeking employment in innovative firms
- Underserved populations who benefit from competitive markets
This is textbook regulatory capture: using “safety” rhetoric to protect market share.
Comparative Analysis: Nigeria vs. Similar Economies
To understand just how extreme Nigeria’s position is, let’s examine how comparable emerging markets regulate their capital markets.
Kenya: The African Counterexample
Economic Profile:
- GDP: ~$115 billion (Nigeria: ~$375 billion)
- Population: ~54 million (Nigeria: ~220 million)
- Tech ecosystem: Mature, competitive, globally recognized
Capital Requirements for Fund Managers:
- Kenya: KES 50 million (~$385,000)
- Nigeria: ₦5 billion (~$3.5 million)
Outcome: Kenya has become Africa’s fintech capital. M-Pesa pioneered mobile money globally. Kenyan startups raised $680M in 2024 despite a smaller economy.
Why the difference?
Kenya’s Capital Markets Authority (CMA) takes a tiered, risk-based approach:
- Lower barriers for entry-level operators
- Graduated requirements based on AUM (Assets Under Management)
- Sandbox environments for innovation
- Regular engagement with the industry
The result: innovation flourishes while investor protection remains strong. Kenya hasn’t had the market failures Nigeria fears—it’s had market success Nigeria should envy.
India: Emerging Market Sophistication
Economic Profile:
- GDP: ~$3.9 trillion
- Population: ~1.4 billion
- Capital markets: Highly sophisticated, globally integrated
SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) Requirements:
For Portfolio Management Services (equivalent to Nigeria’s fund managers):
- Minimum capital: ₹500 million INR (~$600,000)
- Nigeria equivalent: ₦5 billion (~$3.5 million)
Despite being:
- A much larger economy
- With far more sophisticated markets
- Handling significantly higher volumes
India requires 5.8x LESS capital than Nigeria.
India’s Approach:
- Graduated licensing (small, medium, large operators)
- Innovation sandboxes for fintech
- Technology-neutral regulations
- Regular consultation with market participants
Outcome: India is producing unicorns quarterly. PhonePe, Paytm, Zerodha—all grew under regulatory frameworks that balanced innovation with protection.
Indonesia: The Southeast Asian Parallel
Economic Profile:
- GDP: ~$1.4 trillion
- Population: ~277 million
- Similar demographics: Young, mobile-first, financially underserved
OJK (Financial Services Authority) Requirements:
For Investment Management:
- Minimum capital: IDR 25 billion (~$1.6 million)
- Nigeria: ₦5 billion (~$3.5 million)
Indonesia requires 2.2x LESS despite:
- Larger economy
- More complex geography (archipelago)
- Higher transaction volumes
Indonesia’s Framework:
- Clear fintech categorization
- Proportional regulation based on systemic risk
- Active fintech association engagement
- Regulatory sandboxes with graduation pathways
Result: 300+ registered fintech companies serving 160M+ users. GoPay, OVO, and Dana have driven financial inclusion to 60%+ of adults.
Brazil: The Latin American Comparison
Economic Profile:
- GDP: ~$2.2 trillion
- Population: ~215 million
- Highly developed capital markets
CVM (Securities Commission) Requirements:
For Portfolio Managers:
- Minimum capital: BRL 2 million (~$400,000)
- Nigeria: ₦5 billion (~$3.5 million)
Brazil requires 8.75x LESS capital than Nigeria, despite:
- Significantly larger economy
- More mature markets
- Higher institutional sophistication
Brazil’s Regulatory Evolution:
After realizing traditional regulations were stifling innovation, Brazil’s Central Bank launched:
- Open Banking mandates (forcing competition)
- Instant payment system (PIX – revolutionary success)
- Regulatory sandboxes
- Proportional capital requirements
Outcome: Brazilian fintech raised $2.7 billion in 2024. Nubank became Latin America’s most valuable bank—starting from zero in 2013—under regulations that enabled rather than blocked innovation.
South Africa: The Continental Comparison
Economic Profile:
- GDP: ~$380 billion (comparable to Nigeria)
- Most developed capital markets in Africa
- Sophisticated regulatory environment
FSCA (Financial Sector Conduct Authority) Requirements:
For Discretionary Fund Managers:
- Minimum capital: ZAR 5 million (~$270,000)
- Nigeria: ₦5 billion (~$3.5 million)
South Africa requires 13x LESS despite having:
- More developed markets
- Higher per capita wealth
- Stronger institutional frameworks
South Africa’s Philosophy:
- Treat Customers Fairly (TCF) outcomes-based regulation
- Proportionality principle
- Innovation facilitation alongside protection
Result: South Africa punches above its weight in financial services, exporting expertise across the continent and maintaining one of Africa’s most respected regulatory regimes.
The Pattern: Nigeria Is the Outlier
When we map minimum capital requirements against economic sophistication, Nigeria emerges as a shocking outlier:
Nigeria’s Position: A Percentage Comparison
Nigeria vs. most permissive peer (typically Kenya or South Africa):
| Category | Nigeria | Most Permissive | Nigeria Premium |
|---|---|---|---|
| Portfolio Manager | $3.52M | $270K (SA) | 1,203% more expensive |
| VC Manager | $140K | $50K (Kenya) | 180% more expensive |
| Robo Adviser | $70K | $25K (SA) | 180% more expensive |
| Broker-Dealer | $1.41M | $200K (SA) | 605% more expensive |
| PE Manager | $352K | $180K (SA) | 95% more expensive |
| Inter-Dealer | $1.41M | $250K (SA) | 464% more expensive |
Nigeria vs. Most Restrictive Peer (typically Indonesia)
| Category | Nigeria | Indonesia | Nigeria Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Portfolio Manager | $3.52M | $1.6M | 120% more expensive |
| VC Manager | $140K | $120K | 17% more expensive |
| Robo Adviser | $70K | $60K | 17% more expensive |
Even compared to the most restrictive peer economy, Nigeria is significantly more expensive across the board.
The Innovation Sandbox Deficit
| Jurisdiction | Has Sandbox | Tiered Licensing | Max Time in Sandbox | Graduation Path |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kenya | ✅ | ✅ | 24 months | Clear criteria |
| South Africa | ✅ | ✅ | 12 months | Automatic if criteria met |
| India | ✅ | ✅ | 24 months | Graduated compliance |
| Indonesia | ✅ | ✅ | 18 months | Performance-based |
| Brazil | ✅ | ✅ | 24 months | Revenue/user thresholds |
| Singapore | ✅ | ✅ | 36 months | Flexible graduation |
| UK | ✅ | ✅ | Varies | Case-by-case |
| UAE | ✅ | ✅ | 24 months | Milestone-based |
| Nigeria | ❌ | ❌ | N/A | Pay full price or don’t play |
Nigeria is the ONLY jurisdiction without innovation sandboxes or tiered licensing while simultaneously having the HIGHEST absolute capital requirements.
| Country | GDP (Billion) | Fund Mgr. Capital | As % of GDP/capita |
|---|---|---|---|
| India | $3,900 | $600,000 | 27.5% |
| Indonesia | $1,400 | $1,600,000 | 35.6% |
| Brazil | $2,200 | $400,000 | 3.7% |
| South Africa | $380 | $270,000 | 3.9% |
| Kenya | $115 | $385,000 | 18.5% |
| Nigeria | $375 | $3,500,000 | 162% |
Nigeria’s requirement is 162% of GDP per capita—an absurd multiple compared to any peer economy.
What Nigeria Gets Wrong: Five Fatal Flaws
Flaw #1: Confusing Capital with Competence
The SEC’s implicit assumption: More money at the start equals better investor outcomes.
Reality: Capital doesn’t predict:
- Quality of investment decisions
- Strength of risk management
- Integrity of operators
- Innovation capacity
What predicts these? Regulation, supervision, and enforcement quality.
Kenya, India, and Brazil have proven you can have:
- Lower capital barriers
- Robust investor protection
- Thriving innovation
The SEC is solving the wrong problem with the wrong tool.
Flaw #2: Ignoring Developmental Economics
Nigeria is not Switzerland. It’s an emerging market where:
- 60% of adults lack formal bank accounts
- Most economic activity is informal
- Digital inclusion is accelerating but incomplete
- Financial literacy is limited
In this context, you need more competition in financial services, not less. More players means:
- Better pricing for consumers
- Innovation in serving underserved segments
- Job creation
- Technology transfer
- Competitive pressure on incumbents
High barriers create oligopolies. Oligopolies create rent-seeking. Rent-seeking creates stagnation.
Flaw #3: Assuming Foreign Capital Is the Solution
At $3.5 million, the implicit message is: “Let foreign fund managers handle this.”
Why this is catastrophic:
Economic Leakage: Foreign managers repatriate profits. Local managers recirculate wealth.
Misaligned Incentives: Foreign operators optimize for offshore LPs. Local managers understand local market dynamics.
Knowledge Transfer: Local managers train local talent. Foreign operators import expats.
Innovation Gaps: Foreign players bring proven models. Local operators innovate for local conditions.
Nigeria is essentially outsourcing its financial services innovation to entities with minimal local accountability.
Flaw #4: Ignoring the Offshore Exodus
Here’s what happens when regulation becomes prohibitive:
Scenario A: Nigerian founder has a brilliant fintech idea requiring an asset management license.
Options:
- Raise $3.5M in Nigeria (nearly impossible at the idea stage)
- Incorporate in Kenya, Mauritius, or Seychelles, where requirements are 10x lower
- Build offshore, serve Nigerian customers remotely
- Give up
Most choose option 2 or 3.
Result:
- Jobs created elsewhere
- Taxes paid elsewhere
- Expertise developed elsewhere
- Nigeria becomes a market, not an economy
This is already happening. Nigerian founders are increasingly incorporating in:
- Delaware, USA (for VC friendliness)
- Mauritius (for regulatory ease)
- Kenya (for African credibility)
The SEC thinks they’re protecting Nigeria. They’re actually exporting its future.
Flaw #5: Mistiming the Global Fintech Revolution
We are in the midst of the greatest financial services transformation in history:
- DeFi challenging traditional finance
- Embedded finance becoming ubiquitous
- AI revolutionizing investment management
- Blockchain enabling new asset classes
- Mobile money reaching billions
Legacy players built for the old world are being disrupted globally.
Nigeria’s SEC just decided this is the perfect time to… protect the legacy players and block the disruptors.
This is strategic malpractice.
Countries winning in fintech: USA, UK, Singapore, UAE, India, Kenya. Common thread: Regulatory environments that enable innovation while managing risk
Countries losing: Those that prioritize incumbent protection over competition
Nigeria just chose to join the losers’ column.
The Real Cost: What Nigeria Will Lose
Lost Economic Output
Conservative estimate based on Kenya’s fintech economic impact:
- Fintech contributes ~8% of Kenya’s GDP
- Applied to Nigeria: ~$30 billion in potential annual economic activity
- Over 10 years: $300 billion in cumulative lost output
Lost Employment
Fintech is Nigeria’s fastest-growing employment sector:
- Average fintech employs 50-200 people
- If regulations prevent 100 new fintechs from forming
- Direct jobs lost: 5,000-20,000
- Indirect jobs (merchants, agents, ecosystem): 50,000-100,000
Lost Financial Inclusion
Nigeria’s financial inclusion rate: ~64% Kenya’s: ~83% Gap attributable partly to fintech innovation: ~15-20 percentage points
In absolute terms:
- 33-44 million Nigerians who could have gained access
- Locked out because startups that would serve them can’t afford licenses
Lost Tax Revenue
Fintech companies are taxpayers:
- Corporate income tax
- VAT on services
- PAYE from employees
- Withholding taxes
100 fintechs generating average $5M revenue each:
- Total: $500M annual revenue
- Tax contribution (conservative 25%): $125M annually
- Over 10 years: $1.25 billion in lost government revenue
Lost Innovation Spillovers
Fintech ecosystems create:
- Engineering talent pools
- Product management expertise
- Regulatory compliance specialists
- Customer success best practices
These skills transfer to other sectors. Limiting fintech limits Nigeria’s overall digital transformation.
Who This Really Protects (Hint: Not Investors)
Let’s be explicit about who benefits:
Winners
Incumbent Banks:
- Face less competition from fintech challengers
- Can continue charging higher fees
- Maintain market share without innovation pressure
Established Asset Managers:
- Already meet capital requirements
- Face reduced competitive threat
- Can maintain existing client bases without service improvement
Foreign Financial Institutions:
- $3.5M is manageable for international players
- Can enter market with less local competition
- Extract value without building local ecosystems
Rent-Seeking Intermediaries:
- Higher barriers mean founders need “fixers”
- Regulatory complexity creates consulting opportunities
- Gatekeepers accumulate power
Losers
Nigerian Founders Without Wealth:
- Dreams deferred or abandoned
- Forced to relocate
- Talent exported
Nigerian Consumers:
- Pay higher fees due to less competition
- Access fewer innovative services
- Remain underserved
The Nigerian Economy:
- Misses tech-driven growth
- Loses tax revenue
- Falls behind regional peers
Future Generations:
- Inherit less competitive economy
- Have fewer employment opportunities
- Bear costs of today’s regulatory capture
The Comparative Verdict: Nigeria Chose Wrong
When placed alongside peer economies, Nigeria’s approach is indefensible:
Kenya chose innovation with guardrails → Became Africa’s fintech hub
India chose graduated access → Produced globally competitive fintechs
Indonesia chose proportional regulation → Achieved 60% financial inclusion
Brazil chose open competition → Created Latin America’s most valuable bank (Nubank)
South Africa chose outcomes-based regulation → Maintained continental leadership
Nigeria chose prohibitive barriers → Will harvest stagnation
There is no scenario where Nigeria’s approach produces better outcomes than these alternatives. None.
Every comparable economy that prioritized innovation while maintaining investor protection is thriving.
Nigeria is betting against a proven model.
What Should Have Been Done: An Alternative Framework
Nigeria didn’t need to choose between investor protection and innovation. Numerous jurisdictions prove you can have both.
The Tiered Licensing Model
Tier 1: Entry-Level Operators
- Capital: ₦100 million ($70,000)
- Max AUM: ₦5 billion ($3.5M)
- Limited product set
- Enhanced reporting requirements
- Clear graduation pathway to Tier 2
Tier 2: Mid-Market Operators
- Capital: ₦1 billion ($700,000)
- Max AUM: ₦50 billion ($35M)
- Expanded product access
- Standard reporting
- Pathway to Tier 3
Tier 3: Full-Service Operators
- Capital: ₦5 billion ($3.5M)
- No AUM limits
- Full product suite
- Institutional-grade requirements
This allows:
- Founders to start small and grow
- Investors are protected through AUM limits at each tier
- Competition in all market segments
- Innovation without systemic risk
Precedent: India, UK, Singapore all use variants of this model successfully.
The Sandbox Approach
Create formal innovation sandboxes where:
- Startups can test with reduced capital requirements
- Clear success metrics for graduation
- Time-limited licenses (2-3 years)
- Caps on customer numbers/AUM
- Enhanced supervision during the sandbox period
Precedent: UK FCA, Singapore MAS, and DFSA (UAE) have all proven that this works.
The Proportional Capital Model
Link capital requirements to systemic risk, not arbitrary thresholds:
- Low-risk activities (robo-advisory, small-scale fund management): Lower capital
- Medium-risk (proprietary trading, larger AUM): Medium capital
- High-risk (leverage, derivatives, systemic exposure): Higher capital
This aligns regulatory burden with actual risk to the financial system.
Precedent: Basel III principles, EU MiFID II, IOSCO standards.
The Technology-Enabled Supervision Model
Instead of using capital as a proxy for safety, invest in:
- Real-time transaction monitoring
- Automated compliance reporting
- Risk-based supervision
- Data-driven enforcement
Precedent: Singapore, Estonia, and the UAE all demonstrate that technology can enable effective supervision with lower barriers.
The Political Economy Question
Why would Nigeria’s SEC choose the most restrictive possible framework?
Three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Genuine Misunderstanding
Perhaps the SEC genuinely believes higher capital equals better outcomes. This would represent:
- Failure to study international best practices
- Ignorance of developmental economics
- Capture by traditional finance thinking
- Well-intentioned but catastrophically wrong
Hypothesis 2: Regulatory Capture
Perhaps incumbent financial institutions lobbied for high barriers to protect market share. This would represent:
- Corruption of the regulatory process
- Prioritization of private interest over public good
- Abdication of developmental mandate
- Deliberate harm to competition
Hypothesis 3: Risk Aversion Pathology
Perhaps the SEC is so afraid of market failures that it’d rather have no market than a dynamic one. This would represent:
- Cowardice masquerading as prudence
- Unwillingness to do the hard work of effective supervision
- Preference for stagnation over managed innovation
- Failure of regulatory imagination
Most likely: A combination of all three.
Regardless of intent, the effect is the same: Nigeria’s financial services innovation is being strangled in its crib.
Conclusion: A Decade Lost Before It Begins
Nigeria had a choice in January 2026:
- Join Kenya, India, Indonesia, and Brazil in building competitive, innovative financial services sectors
- Or price out local innovation in favor of incumbent protection
They chose the latter.
This decision will reverberate for years:
By 2030:
- Kenya’s fintech sector will be 5x Nigeria’s (despite a smaller economy)
- Talented Nigerian founders will be building in Delaware, not Lagos
- Financial inclusion will stagnate as competition dries up
- Nigeria will be importing financial services innovation rather than exporting it
By 2035:
- A generation of potential founders will have aged out of their risk-taking years
- Incumbent banks will be even more entrenched
- Reversing these regulations will be politically difficult
- Nigeria will look at peer economies’ fintech success and wonder what could have been
This is not hypothetical. We’ve seen this movie before:
India in the 1970s: Protected incumbents, restricted innovation → The “License Raj” → Decades lost China in the 1980s: Special Economic Zones, graduated opening → Explosive growth Brazil pre-2010s: Protected banking oligopoly → High fees, low access Brazil post-2010s: Regulatory opening → Fintech revolution
Nigeria just chose the Indian 1970s path when it could have chosen the Chinese 1980s approach.
The Uncomfortable Truth
Nigeria’s SEC doesn’t believe in Nigerian founders.
That’s the only conclusion one can draw from regulations that price out local innovators while welcoming foreign capital.
If the SEC truly believed Nigerians could build world-class financial services, they would create frameworks that enable local talent to try, fail, learn, and eventually succeed—as every successful innovation ecosystem does.
Instead, they’ve said: “Unless you have generational wealth or foreign backing, your innovation isn’t wanted here.”
This is not investor protection. This is innovation prevention.
And Nigeria will pay for this mistake for decades.
Call to Action: What Must Happen Now
For Nigerian Founders
Don’t wait for regulations to change:
- Incorporate offshore if needed
- Build in jurisdictions that want your innovation
- Serve Nigerian customers remotely if necessary
- Document this regulatory failure
- Vote with your feet
For Investors
Pressure the SEC:
- Submit formal comments opposing these requirements
- Fund legal challenges if necessary
- Invest in regional alternatives to create competitive pressure
- Make clear you’ll allocate capital where regulation is sensible
For Industry Associations
Coordinate opposition:
- Publish research on economic impact
- Present alternative frameworks
- Engage media to build public pressure
- Threaten a mass exodus to regional competitors
For the SEC
Reverse this immediately:
- Admit the error
- Implement tiered licensing
- Create innovation sandboxes
- Study international best practices
- Remember your developmental mandate
For the International Development Community
Condition support on regulatory sanity:
- World Bank, IFC, AfDB should publicly oppose these regulations
- Tie the developmental funding to competitive financial services frameworks
- Support countries (like Kenya) doing it right
- Name and shame regulatory capture
Final Word: Nigeria at a Crossroads
Every emerging economy faces a choice: protect incumbents or enable innovation.
Countries that choose protection (India in the 1970s, Latin America for decades) stagnate.
Countries that choose innovation with intelligent regulation (China’s SEZs, India post-1991, Brazil’s recent fintech opening) thrive.
Nigeria’s SEC just chose protection.
Unless this decision is reversed, historians will mark January 16, 2026, as the day Nigeria chose to become a cautionary tale rather than a success story.
The infrastructure was there. The talent exists. The market opportunity is massive.
All that was needed was a regulation that enabled rather than blocked.
Instead, Nigeria built a wall around its financial services sector and called it “protection.”
This is not just bad policy. This is developmental malpractice.
And every other African country is watching—and learning what NOT to do.
Appendix: Detailed Comparative Table
| Jurisdiction | Fund Mgr Capital | Broker-Dealer | Innovation Sandbox | Tiered Licensing | Regulatory Philosophy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria (2026) | $3.5M | $1.4M | No | No | Prohibitive barriers |
| Kenya | $385K | $280K | Yes | Yes | Graduated access |
| South Africa | $270K | $200K | Yes | Yes | Outcomes-based |
| India | $600K | $400K | Yes | Yes | Proportional risk |
| Indonesia | $1.6M | $900K | Yes | Yes | Facilitative |
| Brazil | $400K | $300K | Yes | Yes | Competition-driven |
| Singapore | $800K | $500K | Yes | Yes | Innovation-first |
| UK | $750K | $600K | Yes | Yes | Principles-based |
| UAE (DIFC) | $500K | $350K | Yes | Yes | Global hub model |
Nigeria is the ONLY jurisdiction without sandboxes or tiered licensing while having the HIGHEST absolute requirements.
This is not leadership. This is isolation.
This research article represents an independent analysis and does not constitute legal or investment advice. All figures are approximations based on publicly available data and may vary with exchange rate fluctuations.
